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BOOK REVIEW
GOVERNMENT. By
Archibald Cox. New York: Oxford University Press. 1976. Pp. vii,
118. $6.95
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN

Reviewed By Marc L Steinberg*
Based upon the four Chichele Lectures he delivered in early
1975 at All Souls College, Oxford University, Professor Cox succinctly examines the proper role which the Supreme Court should
play in the American democratic process. In particular, Cox discusses the widespread usage of constitutional adjudication as an
instrument to achieve social reform. Placing great emphasis upon
the landmark rulings of the Warren Court, Cox inquires whether the
Supreme Court should assume such a large political role.
Beginning his analysis with Chief Justice Marshall's historical
opinion in Marbury v. Madison,' Cox traces many of the significant
cases concerning constitutional issues decided by the Court. The
subject matter of these holdings vary greatly, ranging from the
Court's overruling of 175 years of settled legal precedent in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,' to Baker v. Carr3 and its implementa* A.B., University of Michigan; J.D., University of California, Los Angeles; 1976-77,
LL.M. Candidate, Yale University. Member, California Bar.
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Although not discussed by Cox, Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), is helpful to show that
the Federal Constitution is not a static document but should be flexibly interpreted to meet
the various exigencies which are distinctly contemporary in nature:
This provision is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and,
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. To have prescribed the means by which government should, in all future time, execute its
powers, would have been to change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and
give it the properties of a legal code. It would have been an unwise attempt to
provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have
been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur.
Id. at 415 (emphasis in original).
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In New York Times, the Supreme Court held that "the First and
Fourteenth Amendments bar a state from awarding a public official damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless the falsehood is published with knowledge
of its falsity or with reckless disregard for whether it be true or false." A. Cox, THE ROLE OF
THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT at 38-39 (1976) Ihereinafter cited as CoxI.
3. 369 U.S. 186 (1962); see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Referring to these
decisions, Cox observes that "[bly these 'one man, one vote' decisions the Court removed
the chief remaining source of political inequality in the United States and gave impetus to
other correctives." Cox at 69.
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tion of the "one man, one vote" principle. Although providing detailed examination of the major Burger Court holdings, such as Roe
v. Wade4 and United States v. Nixon,5 Cox places primary emphasis
on the activist approach of the Warren Court. According to Cox,
"[tihe most striking aspect of constitutional adjudication under
the Warren Court was its vigorous use as an instrument of reform." '
Indeed, the New York Times case greatly enlarged the freedom of
the press, and, in so doing, overruled 175 years of settled law. Likewise, the "one man, one vote" holding invalidated long-settled political practices. And, of course, Brown v. Board of Education7 not
only overturned Plessy v. Ferguson,' decided over half a century
prior to Brown, but also the culture and tradition of an entire region. 9 In all, "the Chief Justiceship of Earl Warren brought a period
of extraordinary creativity in constitutional law which has greatly
enlarged the role of the Supreme Court in American government
and further politicized the process of constitutional adjudication.""
But in so doing, Cox inquires whether such an approach was a
proper one for the Court to adopt. Thus, the theme prevailing
throughout Cox's work evolves around one basic question: "Has the
Judicial Branch over-expanded its role in American government
and over-politicized the process of constitutional adjudication?",,
The question is surely not a novel one but Cox's analysis, interspersed with illustrative examples, offers a refreshing approach.
Upon confronting this question, Cox finds two institutional concerns
which have arisen from recent activism in constitutional adjudication. First, by continuing to base its decisions primarily on social
policy rather than conventional legal criteria, he fears that the
Court may become unduly result oriented and thus sacrifice its
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Cox at 51-52, 113-14.
5. 418 U.S. 683 (1974); see Cox at 26-27, 104.
6. Cox at 100. In reference to this judicial activism, Cox submits that some of the Court's
landmark constitutional decisions resulted "from reading into the generalities of the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses notions of wise and fundamental policy which are not
even faintly suggested by the words of the Constitution, and which lack substantial support
in other conventional sources of law." Id.
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
9. See Cox, at 78-80, 100, 109.
10. Id. at 100. In so doing, "the Justices have rejected other precepts of judicial deference
to the legislative process by making their own findings upon underlying questions of fact and
by appraising and balancing opposing interests." Id. at 101.
11. Id. at 102.
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power of legitimacy. Second, Cox claims that excessive reliance
upon courts to shape public policy rather than upon the legislative
and executive branches might very well stunt the growth of the
2
democratic process.'
These concerns are of prime importance, Cox believes, for
"[tihe Judicial Branch is uniquely dependent upon the power of
legitimacy when engaged in constitutional adjudication."'" In order
to command acceptance and support, the judiciary must convince
the populace, the press, the legal profession, and the executive and
legislative branches that it is performing only those functions assigned to it. For without this power of legitimacy, the courts would
be exceedingly vulnerable to attacks from the other branches of
government. 4
But what are these proper functions that the Court is to perform? Which abuses would leave the Court subject to loss of its
power of legitimacy? Cox never seems to squarely confront these
questions. Instead, he acknowledges that the Warren Court, more
so than any other Court in American history, made new law in
overturning long settled precedents. Rather than rebuking this approach, Cox concludes that, due to this activism, "the prestige of
the Supreme Court is surely greater than that of other branches of
government today, and I am inclined to think that it has never been
higher."' 5
Judicial activism in constitutional adjudication, however, must
not be premised solely on pragmatic political considerations.
Rather, the creation of constitutional rights must be based upon
principles sufficiently embedded within the community so as to
assure their endurance through significant periods of time." But
how is the Court to perceive which principles are sufficiently engrained within the nation? Cox attempts to answer this inquiry by
replying:
Constitutional adjudication depends . . . upon a delicate, symbiotic relation. The Court must know us better than we know
ourselves. Its opinions may . . . sometimes be the voice of the
spirit, reminding us of our better selves ....
But while the opin12. Id. at 103.
13. Id.

14. Id. at 103-04. "Although the courts control neither the purse nor the sword, their
decrees often run against the Executive, set aside the will of Congress, and dictate to a State."
Id. at 103.
15. Id. at 110.
16. Id. at 114.
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ions of the Court can help to shape our national understanding
of ourselves, the roots -of its decisions must be already in the
nation. The aspirations voiced by the Court must be those the
community is willing not only to avow but in the end to live by.
For the power of the great constitutional decisions rests upon the
accuracy of the Court's perception of this kind of common will
and upon the Court's ability, by expressing its perception, ultimately to command a consensus.
Does Cox really answer the inquiry or does he merely assume
that the Court has the ability to perceive these embedded values?
Further, Cox's approach assigns to the Court a large political role
in our democratic system. Is this proper? Should the Court, which
is not politically accountable, be entitled to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of "due process" or "equal protection"? Certain eminent legal scholars surely would conclude that
Cox is incorrect, for although he agrees that the Court's decisions
must be supported by enduring legal principles, Cox also contends
that the enlarged role of the Court into the political arena is commendable. Commenting on this situation, Dean Griswold acknowledged that the Court must, at times, "make law." This function,
however, must be "an understanding process, not an emotional one,
a self-effacing process, not a means of vindicating 'absolute convictions.' "Is
[I]t is one thing to act according to one's personal predilections
or choice, and a wholly different thing to come to one's own best
conclusion in the light of his understanding of the law as it has
been established by statute, decision, tradition, received ideals
and standards, and all the other elements that go to make up our
legal system. . . .The question is how far and how hard he [the
judge] seeks to be guided by an outside frame of reference, called
for convenience "the law," in arriving at his conclusion, rather
than focusing his intellectual effort, perhaps unawares, on justifying his conclusion arrived at somehow or other in some other
9
way.'
17. Id. at 117-18.
18. Griswold, Forward: Of Time and Attitudes-ProfessorHart and Judge Arnold, 74
HARV. L. REV. 81, 94 (1960). For other works advocating judicial restraint, see R. KEETON,
VENTURING To Do JUSTICE (1969); Hart, Forward: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 84 (1959); Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards:
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
19. Griswold, supra note 18, at 92. Regarding the role of the Supreme Court in the
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Thus, according to those authorities in favor of judicial restraint,
the Court has become too much result oriented. Rather, the Court
should reach its decisions "through the painful intellectual effort of
judgment in the light of the law.
...
I"
But other scholarly experts believe that Cox's view is correct.
In rebutting the Griswold-Hart approach, Judge Arnold asserted
that the only type of court which could fulfill their prescription
would be a court composed of men without deep-seated convictions about current national problems, a court whose members
have not had enough previous experience with the controversial
ideas which the Court must eventually express as law to have ever
taken sides in the struggle; such a court might be found in a
Trappist monastery.2
Elaborating, Judge Arnold concluded: "To suggest that judges who
hold differing views with absolute convictions. . . are going to surrender those views, moved solely by logic and debate, is to betray a
lack of knowledge of the history of the Court."22 Even more emphatically, Chief Justice Traynor, a zealous advocate for judicial activism, commented:
[T]he real concern is not the remote possibility of too many
creative opinions but their continuing scarcity. The growth of the
law, far from being unduly accelerated by judicial boldness, is
unduly hampered by a judicial lethargy that masks itself as judicial dignity.

23

American democratic process, Professor Hart's philosophy is in agreement with that advanced by Dean Griswold:
Only opinions which are grounded in reason and not on mere fiat or precedent
can do the job which the Supreme Court of the United States has to do .... Only
opinions of this kind can carry the weight which has to be carried by the opinions
of a tribunal which, after all, does not have the power either in theory or in
practice to ram its own personal preferences down other people's throats.
Hart, supra note 18, at 99.
20. Griswold, supra note 18, at 93.
21. Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1298, 1313 (1960).
22. Id.; see O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 35 (1881), where Justice Holmes observed:
The very considerations which judges most rarely mention, and always with an
apology, are the secret root from which the law draws all the juices of life. I mean,
of course, considerations of what is expedient for the community concerned.
23. R. Traynor, Comment on Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND
ToMORROw 48, 52 (M. Paulsen ed. 1959). Justifying the need for judicial activism in the

legislative sphere, Chief Justice Traynor contended:
Legislators are under no compulsion to disclose the reasons for a rule, let alone
to keep a chronicle of its origins. Sometimes a statute is enveloped in a history so

Which view-judicial restraint or activism-is correct? The
issue is by no means a novel one. Cox, however, approaches this
question in a refreshing and interesting manner. Although his conclusions are certainly debatable, Cox's work provides useful insights
into a troublesome area.

voluminous or ambiguous as to be more confusing than revealing. A statute may
be dubious because those who sponsored it were not motivated to do so in the
public interest or because those who enacted it did so without adequate knowledge or consideration of its objectives or implications. For all the vaunted responsiveness of legislatures to the will of the people, it is no secret that legislative
committees, particularly those dominated by the elder statesmen of a seniority
system, tend to dilute the reliability of statutes as expression of public policy.
Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U.L. REV. 401, 424 (1968).

